Owais Hammam was walking near his home in Khirbet Bani Harith in the West Bank on December 3, 2025, when, , he was kidnapped by Jewish settlers. Over several hours at a nearby settlement, the 18-year-old Palestinian is alleged to have endured .
Israel military soldiers were reportedly involved in the incident, before they eventually released him the next morning. Hamman was hospitalized with multiple injuries and severe psychological trauma.
The alleged attack is far from isolated. The post-October 7, 2023, environment has seen an , which has gone from primarily involving vandalism and property destruction to now being marked by kidnapping, prolonged abuse and . In the two years to October 2025, were “forcibly displaced by settler violence and movement restrictions,” according to United Nations figures.
Violence has increased to an extent that the United Nations said October 2025 was since it started recording incidents in 2006.
As a scholar who has studied , I contend that the dramatic escalation of settler violence in the West Bank reveals a profound . Rather than serving as purported neutral enforcers of law and order, the military, Israeli police and the broader governmental apparatus have become increasingly aligned with — and at times directly complicit in — violent settler actions against Palestinians.
This institutional reluctance to address settler violence is not merely a failure of enforcement, I would argue, but a deliberate outcome of deep social, political and cultural changes that have reshaped Israeli society since at least the mid-1990s.
Settlers’ dream government
The most visible manifestation of this transformation is the , formed in December 2022.
For the first time, key ministerial positions are held by individuals with explicit to some of the most violent streams of the settlement movement. Hence, it is not surprising that prominent figures such as — both settlers with what has been described as extremist ideologies — have actively implemented policies that facilitate and legitimize settler violence.
For instance, Ben-Gvir has significantly eased firearm regulations, issuing over 100,000 new gun licenses since October 2023, with .
Smotrich, meanwhile, has publicly distributed security equipment to illegal outposts and . This political backing fosters a climate in which settlers feel emboldened to act with impunity.
Beyond individual ministers, the Israeli government has pursued structural reforms that systematically undermine institutional checks on settler violence.
The transfer of the main Israeli governing body in the West Bank — the Civil Administration authority — represents a fundamental shift in governance. For decades, the Civil Administration coordinated the provision of West Bank services such as health and education. It also served as an instrument for coordinating with the Palestinian Authority, the body entrusted per with limited self-rule over parts of the occupied West Bank.
By placing the Civil Administration under political control rather than independent military command, the government has weakened one of the few mechanisms capable of restraining settler expansion.
Similarly, plans to subordinate the threaten to dismantle the unified command structure that has been instrumental in managing tensions in the occupied West Bank since 1967.
Capitulation to settlers
Concurrent to these developments has been a blurring of lines between civilian settlers and uniformed security personnel. After October 7, 2023, Israeli authorities distributed 8,000 army rifles to so-called .
These armed settler groups now operate alongside — and are increasingly indistinguishable from — official security forces. Settlers frequently during attacks on Palestinians.
Security infrastructure such as police stations is often physically located within settlements, fostering .
I would suggest that this geographic and institutional proximity makes neutral policing nearly impossible.
The cultural and social dimensions of this phenomenon run even deeper. Many settlers serve as army reservists, creating overlapping identities between civilian and military personnel.
Civilian security coordinators, who are responsible for coordination between the military and the settlements’ own “defense squads,” actively shape military operational policy. They help define settlement boundaries, determine areas prohibited to Palestinians and .
Soldiers typically interpret clashes as friction between civilians rather than crimes requiring intervention. When violence intensifies, they often declare an “emergency situation” and defend settlers rather than protecting Palestinian victims.
Societal shifts
The transformation of Israeli institutions reflects broader societal changes where the settler movement has evolved from one of many societal factions .
Settlers hold key positions in government and military leadership and exercise considerable political influence.
As a result, settler violence has become increasingly embedded in the operational logic of state institutions, turning law enforcement bodies from ostensibly neutral arbiters into what international observers increasingly describe as .
It represents, I would argue, a fundamental reorientation of state power in explicit service of settler expansionism.
Moreover, the failure to hold perpetrators of settler violence to account reveals the extent of the institutional capture. Between 2005 and 2023, more than 93% of police investigations into settler violence – and only 3% resulted in convictions.
In 2021, the last year for which I was able to obtain data, Israeli authorities opened just 87 investigations for “ideologically motivated offenses,” while U.N. monitors documented 585 incidents.
The Israeli police chief in the West Bank has gone so far as to claim that reports of settler violence are .”
The erosion of judicial scrutiny
The Israeli Supreme Court has formally acknowledged that the West Bank constitutes .
Nonetheless, the judicial architecture historically accommodates settlement expansion. Settlers are subject to Israeli civilian law, including the ability to vote in Israeli elections while Palestinians face military law, producing .
The country’s Supreme Court, while occasionally striking down discriminatory measures against Palestinians, has bowed to security rationales that permit the broader settlement enterprise to proceed. For example, in 2022, the court rejected a petition to return Palestinian land in the city of Hebron, ruling that an Israeli presence is
Similarly, in many petitions against military policy of house demolitions, the Supreme Court has adopted a .
Impact on the peace process
The implications of this institutional capitulation to settlers’ interests extend far beyond the West Bank itself. Settlers have explicitly viewed the war in the Gaza Strip as an opportunity to accelerate their agenda, .
In addition to the humanitarian concerns, this pattern of violence-driven displacement undermines the viability of a , which has returned to international discourse as the centerpiece of “day after” planning for Gaza. It also undermines any claim Israel might make that in lieu of a two-state solution, it can enforce the rule of law equally across people living in territories under its control.
So while international actors focus on ceasefire negotiations and reconstruction, the violence in the West Bank undermines the territorial and demographic foundations necessary for Palestinian statehood and makes the prospect of a lasting ceasefire more distant. The implications of that for a just future are indeed dire.
, Director of Security Studies and Professor of Criminology and Justice Studies,
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